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STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM:
FOUNDATIONS, CONSEQUENCES, AND “BASIC
PRINCIPLES” REVISITED
Connor M. Ewing*
The goal of this Essay is to construct an account of the American federal system
organized around its structural and relational components and to develop an initial
delineation of what I call the politics of sovereignty of the American constitutional
order—the patterns of political behavior and discourse, the relationships, and the
institutional interactions that characterize and decisively shape debates over the scope
and location of government power. That account and the politics it structures, I will
argue, are necessarily dynamic. An ancillary goal of this Essay is to illustrate some of
the implications and requirements of the account of the federal system that I offer. That
is attempted through a close analysis of the “basic principles” announced by Chief
Justice Roberts in his opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (NFIB).
Part I sets forth the structural components and institutional arrangements of the
federal system. A review of the constitutional logic of federalism and mechanisms
designed to preserve the federal bargain demonstrates that the federal system is
underdeterminate, that is, it fixes no single division of power between levels of
government and instead permits a range of potential state-federal relationships within
permissible constitutional bounds. In Part II, I examine the notion of “attachment” in
both the The Federalist and the writings of several prominent Anti-Federalists. I argue
that the attachment of the people—their connections and commitments to a
government—is a crucial determinant of the configuration of state and national power,
which configurations are enabled by federal underdeterminacy.
In Part III, I critically evaluate the “basic principles” of the state-federal
relationship articulated by Chief Justice John Roberts in his NFIB opinion. I argue that
his, and to a large extent the Court’s, understanding of the federal system entails
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Zeisberg. I am additionally grateful for comments from and conversations with Thomas Bell, Maggie
Mosslander, Robert Shaffer, and the participants at the 2014 University of Texas Graduate Conference in
Public Law. Finally, and as ever, my thanks to Cindy Ewing, for this and much else besides.
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denying both constitutional underdeterminacy and the consequences of the variability of
the people’s attachment to their governments. Here I devote the most attention to the
canon of constitutional avoidance, which the Court employed to uphold the Individual
Mandate as a lawful exercise of Congress’s taxing power. After a sustained critique of
the use of the canon in NFIB, I conclude by describing an alternative model of judicial
review—which I call processual review—that is at once consonant with the
understanding of the federal system offered in Parts I and II and yet distinct from the
process-based theories offered by scholars like Herbert Wechsler, Jesse Choper, and
Larry Kramer.
I.INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 690
II.THE STRUCTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY .............................................................................. 694
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What I shall discuss is the great extent to which, in dealing with questions of
constitutional law, we have preferred the method of purported explication or exegesis of
the particular textual passage considered as a directive of action, as opposed to the
method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in
all its parts or in some principal part.
Charles L. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his Edward Douglass White Lectures, presented in 1968 at Louisiana State
University, Charles Black presented a critique of American constitutional interpretation
1. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1969).
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that, though nearly half a century old, still warrants serious consideration. His point of
departure was the observation that in attempting to answer constitutional questions, we
have opted for an interpretive method that seeks to derive meaning and direction from
the constitutional text. This is, in his words, “the method of purported explication or
exegesis of the particular textual passage.”2 The “particular-text style”3 forces those in
search of constitutional guidance to focus on texts that are “in form directive of official
conduct, rather than . . . those that declare or create a relationship out of the existence of
which inference could be drawn.”4 In its place, he outlined and advanced an inferencebased interpretive methodology, one “sounding in the structure of federal union, and in
the relation of federal to state governments.”5 Black’s emphasis on structure and
inference has had a profound impact on constitutional reasoning, serving, for example, as
a model for one of the six modalities of constitutional interpretation identified by Philip
Bobbitt in his seminal work, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution.6
It is no coincidence that Black’s discussion of structural inference and relational
interpretation took the federal system as a primary object of consideration. Not only is
the text-based method he critiques prevalent in federalism jurisprudence, but the statefederal relationship is also, perhaps, the constitutional example par excellence of the
need to draw inferences from structure and relationship. To fully appreciate the force and
potential of the analytical posture Black advocated, we must do more than provide
correctives to instances in constitutional law of the absence of such reasoning. Indeed,
we must reorient our focus and shift from the interpretive domain of constitutional law to
the larger realm of constitutional politics in which law is inscribed. Although Black
reasoned from legal disputes centered on specific textual provisions to the relevant
structures and relationships that clarify the questions presented, the nature of the
American polity can also be glimpsed if we reverse that order and begin with the
structures and relationships fundamental to the constitutional order. Thus reversed, the
goal becomes to arrive at a clear understanding of our constitutional regime, so that
interpretations of our constitutional text can proceed on a reliable foundation.
Implicit in the idea of a written constitution is a notion of defined government, of
explicit declarations that establish guidelines for the legitimate use of political power and
enumerate the proper objects, purposes, and means of legislation and regulation.7 In
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 11.
6. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). See pages 74-92 for
his discussion of the structural modality and pages 77-80 for his direct engagement with Black’s arguments in
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP, supra note 1.
7. This formulation, specifically the choice of “defined government” instead of “limited government” or
some other formulation, is intended to set to the side questions about the nature of constitutional limitations.
While the argument presented here certainly bears on those questions, a full treatment is beyond the scope of
this inquiry, though one dimension of the debate is considered below. See infra pp. 713-16. For a recent and
particularly cogent colloquy on the meaning of “limited government,” as well as a survey of the broader debate
of which it is a part, compare Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L. J. 576 (2014) (arguing
that the internal limits canon, which holds that “the powers of Congress must always be construed as
authorizing less legislation than a general police power would,” is wrong), with Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All
Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L. J. FORUM 180, 181
(2014) (rejecting Primus’s central contention on the basis that “the constitutional text, reasonably interpreted,
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republican governments, those enumerations and limitations are intended to manifest the
sovereignty of the people by identifying them, rather than those who govern, as the
ultimate source of political authority. While the people are sovereign, they select
representatives to exercise sovereign political power over the polity. But this presents a
complication. Even as sovereignty in a constitutional democracy signifies the ultimate
rule of the people—Lincoln’s “political community without a political superior”8—it
also signifies governmental actors with “no higher enforcement agency—no political
superior.”9 Making sense of sovereignty in a constitutional democracy requires coming
to terms with the tension between the sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of
the people’s government(s). As a result, republican constitutional politics are
characterized by what could be called a politics of sovereignty: the patterns of political
behavior and discourse, relationships, and institutional interactions that characterize
debates over the scope and location of government power.
The nature of a constitutional regime’s politics of sovereignty is largely the
function of the structure of its political institutions and the relationships between the
government and the people. In federal systems, the presence of two levels of
government—national and sub-national, each purporting to act on behalf of the people
they represent—fundamentally shapes the politics of sovereignty. In federal regimes, the
perennial question of politics—what should government do?—is complicated by a
further question of specification: which government should do those things?10 As David
Epstein notes in his study of The Federalist, the only unqualifiedly national component
of the “partly federal, and partly national”11 Constitution that Madison identifies in
Federalist 39 is the “government’s ‘operation’ on individuals.”12 As a consequence, in
the American constitutional order “men have two masters, although each is only a master
with respect to its own ‘objects.’”13 Moreover, as we see in both Publius’s case for the
Constitution and the Anti-Federalists’ response, there was neither a clear nor
comprehensive division of powers between the states and the national government.
Rather than establish a determinate state-federal relationship, the Constitution set forth
the legal and political processes through which that relationship would be contested,
defined, and revised. The federal system is fundamentally underdeterminate: the
Constitution fixes no single division of power between levels of government and instead
permits a range of potential state-federal relationships within permissible constitutional
bounds. The underdeterminacy of American federalism inheres principally in the
structural configuration of governing institutions and the relationships between citizens

communicates that the sum of all actual delegated federal power amounts to something less than all possible
delegated power”).
8. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 434 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
9. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS 152 (2013).
10. In his study of federalism and American political development, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICA 8-9 (2012), David Brian Robertson presents a cogent analysis of this aspect of the American federal
system.
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
12. DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 51 (1984).
13. Id. at 51-52.
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and their respective governments.14
The goal of this Essay is to construct an account of the American federal system
organized around its structural and relational components and to develop an initial
delineation of the politics of sovereignty of the American constitutional order. That
account and the politics it structures, I will argue, are necessarily dynamic, resisting the
static conceptions and synchronic analyses that dominate judicial and, to a lesser extent,
academic treatments of the topic. Understanding this account of American federalism
requires inferential and relational reasoning, a recognition with increasing though still
muted prominence in the academic literature.15 An ancillary goal of this Essay is to
illustrate some of the implications of the account of the federal system that I offer. This
is attempted through a close analysis of the “basic principles” announced by Chief
Justice Roberts in his opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius.16 Because NFIB provides a self-conscious and deliberate judicial engagement
with the nature of the federal system, it stands as an instructive example of not only what
the various members of the Court think about American federalism, but also how they
think about it.
Part I sets forth the structural components and institutional arrangements of the
federal system. A review of the constitutional logic of federalism and the mechanisms
designed to preserve the federal bargain demonstrates that the federal system is
underdeterminate, that is, it permits a range of potential state-federal relationships within
permissible constitutional bounds. In Part II, I examine the notion of “attachment” in
both The Federalist and the writings of several prominent Anti-Federalists. I argue that
the attachment of the people—their connections and commitments to a government—is a
crucial determinant of the configuration of state and national power made possible by
federal underdeterminacy. In Part III, I critically evaluate the “basic principles” of the
state-federal relationship articulated by Chief Justice John Roberts in his NFIB opinion.
In that section, I argue that his understanding of the federal system, which is shared by
many on the Court, entails denying both constitutional underdeterminacy and the
consequences of the variability of the people’s attachment to their governments. It is here
that I devote the most attention to the canon of constitutional avoidance, employed by the
Court to uphold the Individual Mandate as a lawful exercise of Congress’s taxing power.
After a sustained critique of the use of the canon in NFIB, I briefly sketch an alternative
model of judicial review—one which I call processual review—that is at once consonant
with the understanding of the federal system offered in Parts I and II and yet distinct
from the process-based theories offered by thinkers like Herbert Wechsler, Jesse Choper,
and Larry Kramer.

14. I employ this notion of underdeterminacy—as well as the term itself, instead of “indeterminacy” or
“ambiguity”—in conformity with others who have addressed the question of the nature of constitutional
powers and the degree of textual constraint. See, e.g., MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 5 n.23 (2013). For a discussion of underdeterminacy and its relation to related
terms like “vagueness” and “ambiguity,” see Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LANGUAGE AND LAW (Lawrence Solan and Peter Tiersma eds., 2012).
15. For the most direct and elaborate development of this argument, see Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the
Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85 (2014).
16. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
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THE STRUCTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY

American federalism is often described as consisting in a “balance” between state
and national power, a “balance” reflecting the intentions of the founders and thus
providing a normative guide for constitutional interpretation.17 The goal of this part of
the Essay is to advance a contrary understanding of the federal system. Indeed, I argue
that the balance model is the theoretical antipode to what the Constitution establishes—a
two-level federal system with an underdeterminate division of political power resulting
in a contested jurisdictional line between the federal and state governments. The first
section describes the underdeterminate division of political power in the federal system,
which I label the constitutional logic of federalism. In the second section, I discuss
protections intended to preserve the federal bargain in light of federal underdeterminacy.
Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the Tenth Amendment, which is often
interpreted as precluding the underdeterminacy that is central to the account of the
federal system I offer.
A. The Constitutional Logic of Federalism
To understand the structure and logic of American federalism, we can begin by
asking a foundational question: What does the Constitution constitute? The Preamble
declares, “We the People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America,” signaling that the charter will govern the collective endeavors of the
several states. The unstated premise is that the states themselves are not constituted by
the Constitution. Rather, they are recognized as extant political bodies and are treated as
such throughout the Constitution. Apart from the question of whether the act of
ratification constituted a national people, we can conclude that it did constitute a national
government in a political context where sovereign states already existed and would
continue to exist in some modified status.18 The question, then as it is now, is how the
national government stands in relation to the states.
This point may seem self-evident, but it is in fact deeply consequential. Because
the states exist in the Constitution largely by implication—their political functions taken
as granted—we can identify a crucially important feature of the federal system’s design:
its underdeterminate dispensation of political power between the states and the national
government. Consider the two options available to the Constitutional Convention. The
first was to comprehensively divide state from national power, drawing a clear
jurisdictional line between the two levels and, in so doing, creating a determinate statefederal relationship. But that is emphatically what the Convention did not do, for reasons
of both possibility and efficacy. First, such an endeavor would have been impossible.

17. See, e.g., id. at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, J.J., dissenting) (“the federal balance is too
essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit
inability to intervene”); and Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 526 U.S 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“the Spending Clause power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the potential
to obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power”). For an academic
development of this understanding, see Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional
Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365 (2014).
18. See Lash, supra note 7, at 183-89 (reviewing the dominant theories of federalism and the place and
understanding of sovereignty therein).
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The delegates could not have identified every possible political contingency and
specified the proper political authority and process appropriate to each. And even if they
could have done so, the political divisions at the Convention would have frustrated
attempts to agree on the specified authority and processes for each contingency. Second,
it would have been counterproductive to seek a determinate state-federal relationship.
The very “stability and energy” the convention sought to combine with “the inviolable
attention due to liberty, and to the Republican form”19 required the ability to address
contingencies in the most effective and appropriate manner, instead of relying on the
foresight of a convention unable to comprehend the political demands of the future. The
latter was the failing of the Articles of Confederation and left the “Government of the
United States . . . destitute of energy.”20
The locus classicus for the argument against determinacy is Federalist 37. There
Madison discusses the “arduous . . . task of marking the proper line of partition, between
the authority of the general, and that of the State Governments.”21 After comparing the
difficulties faced by the Convention to those faced by “the most acute and metaphysical
Philosophers”22 and “the most sagacious and laborious naturalists,”23 he concludes,
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as
more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the
imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the
conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds a fresh
embarrassment. . . . Here then are three sources of vague and incorrect
definitions; indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of
conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.24
Perhaps, though, this could be thought Publian dissembling. It would, after all,
benefit those who favor national over state power to claim that it was impossible to
clearly distinguish national from state objects. If so, then the guise of impossibility could
facilitate the establishment of expansive national power. But the truth is that Federalist
37 was (at least) the second time this argument had appeared. After completing the draft
constitution, the delegates transmitted a letter to Congress introducing their handiwork.
There they admitted:
It is at all Times difficult to draw with Precision the Line between
those Rights which must be surrendered and those which may be
reserved[.] And on the present Occasion this Difficulty was encreased
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 233 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 93 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 234 (James Madison).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 236-37.
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[sic] by a Difference among the several States as to their Situation[,]
Extent[,] Habits[,] and particular Interests.25
To add a final complication, as Edward Purcell observes, the imprecise division of
state and federal power was reinforced by the fact that “the Constitution conceived of
both levels of government as counterpoised forces protecting the same vague and
contested values—liberty, property, and republicanism.”26 Hence, the contention that the
constitutional division of state and national power is underdeterminate is supported by
both the testimony of members of the Constitutional Convention and by the purposes
they conceived both levels of government as serving.
The overlap between state and federal governments that Purcell recognizes points
to the inevitable consequences of the course chosen by the Convention to construct a
federal system. Rather than attempt to specify the exact set of points at which state
power yields to national power (or, perhaps importantly, vice versa27), the delegates
opted for grants of power and restrictions thereon. To wit, the Constitution enumerates
the powers of the national government,28 identifies explicit restrictions on both
national29 and state power,30 and specifies the requirements of interstate conduct.31
Additionally, the national government was endowed with the “executive Power” and
“judicial Power,” housed, respectively, in the office of the president and the federal
courts. The result was a federal government possessed of the inherent powers of national
sovereignty—preservation of national security, superintendence of interstate conflict,
management of the national economy, and the conduct of foreign diplomacy. At the
same time, states maintained “most of the policy tools for governing everyday American
life,”32 including the powers to regulate local commerce, to ensure local peace, and to
preserve and further local welfare.
The result of the Convention’s labors was a mélange of exclusively national,
exclusively state, and concurrently exercised powers. Though defined in broad strokes,
the compound republic was characterized by underdeterminacy, as there was neither an
exhaustive division between state and federal power nor a clear jurisdictional line drawn

25. See MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 584 (1966) [hereinafter
Farrand, RECORDS, accompanied by citation to the volume, followed by a colon and the appropriate page
number(s).]
26. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
ENTERPRISE 191 (2007).
27. There is reason to believe that the directionality of this point is important. Consider, for example, an
articulation of the state-federal relationship that begins from the perspective of national power. The
jurisdictional line would be found at the outer edge established by the full scope of the powers that the
Constitution grants to the national government. If, however, the analysis is reversed, and state power is the
starting point, then the jurisdictional line would be found at the edge of the full extent of the states’ powers, as
expressed in their constitutions and the traditional body of police powers. Unless these two analyses can be said
to establish the same jurisdictional line, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the directionality of the
analysis is consequential for the contours of the state-federal relationship. Here we see the significance of the
relational dimensions of the state-federal relationship, a point alluded to by Gerken, supra note 15, at 113-19.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. III, § 3; art. IV, § 3 and 4.
29. Id. art. I, § 9.
30. Id. art. I, § 10.
31. Id. art. IV, §§ 1-2.
32. Robertson, supra note 10, at 32.
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between the two. This meant that the “true meaning” of the state-federal relationship
could not be arrived at through legal analysis or constitutional interpretation. Rather, it
was an essentially political (and thus contested) question. As David Epstein argues,
“While the Constitution does enumerate the objects of the central government, the
partition between states and nation will not be as much a legal issue as a political one.”33
Coupled with the underdeterminacy of the federal system, the inherently political nature
of the state-federal relationship meant that the division of powers between levels of
government could reflect the will of the people. “If . . . the people should in future
become more partial to the federal than to the State governments,” Madison argued in
Federalist 46, noting that only superior administration could accomplish this, then “they
“ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due.”34 Unless this capacity of the people was to be an illusion,
there had to be a means by which the people’s partiality could be meaningfully
registered. By allowing for the jurisdictional line to be subject to political negotiation,
the underdeterminacy of the federal system did exactly that.
Two specific constitutional provisions underscore the underdeterminacy of the
state-federal relationship, and the consequent need for an inferential and relational
conception of American federalism. The first is the Necessary and Proper Clause, which
makes clear that the Constitution’s identification of congressional powers must not be
read as an exhaustive enumeration. Rather, there are powers undefined by the
Constitution that are nonetheless legitimate exercises of national power. To be sure, this
clause leaves many questions unanswered, including whether it is an independent grant
of power and whether it should be read as conjunctive or not. But that is precisely the
point. Not only does the clause point to lawful powers beyond those explicitly granted,
its formulation raises further questions about the extent of national legislative power. The
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the national government possesses
discretionary power that by its very nature can permit only description and not
enumeration.
The second provision is the Supremacy Clause, which declares that the
Constitution, its laws, and treaties “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”35 and that
state judges are bound by that supreme law. Consider what makes this clause
consequential, that is, what prevents it from being “mere surplusage.”36 If the
Constitution’s division of power was exhaustive, then this clause would be superfluous;
it would follow as a matter of logic that the national government was supreme in the
instances it was granted power and not supreme where the states were granted power. In
other words, there would be no questions occasioned by state-federal relations that a
determinate division of power could not resolve because all such relations would be
comprehended by a determinate federal system. However, if the Supremacy Clause is to
serve anything more than a merely hortative function, it is because the Constitution’s
definition of the federal system is not determinate, and the clause is required to address

33.
34.
35.
36.

Epstein, supra note 12, at 53.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 317 (James Madison).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
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those instances to which the text does not reach but federal supremacy is nonetheless
intended to apply. Equally important, the Supremacy Clause explicitly identifies the
actors and bodies of law relative to which national supremacy is to be understood. Rather
than simply assert the superiority of the national government, the Supremacy Clause
indicates that the supremacy of federal law—whatever exactly that meant—would
necessarily develop and be properly understood in relation to state governments.
B. Preserving the Federal Bargain: Three “Levels” of Constraints
The underdeterminate federal system described above casts new light on a question
central to the Convention and ratification debates: Which level of government stands to
gain from an underdeterminate definition of the state-federal relationship? The AntiFederalist critique of the Constitution (addressed further in Part II) focused on the threat
of consolidation they saw in the institutions established and powers granted by the
document. For their part, the Federalists had the exact opposite fear. As Publius argued
in (inter alia) Federalist 17, 31, and 45,37 it was at least as likely that the states would
encroach on the national government, and the national government would be comparably
ill-equipped to rebuff state encroachments. Both camps were united by the concern that
the federal bargain reached at the Convention would not hold. Thus, two closely related
questions are presented. First, what kind of protections does the Constitution provide for
the federal system? And second, what specific protections does it provide? Both of these
questions bear heavily on the political processes that the underdeterminate federal system
structures and the political contestation that, in turn, shapes that system.
To answer the first question, we can advert to the identification, made by Filippov,
Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, of three “levels” of constraints employed to preserve federal
systems.38 The first level entails “constraints that correspond in part to explicit bargains
among federal subjects over the allocation of authority between them and the federal
center, and other limits on their and the center’s actions.”39 These protections consist of
clear textual commitments identifying the extent of and limitations on the powers
granted and prohibited, as well as promises guaranteeing autonomy in certain spheres.
Level-two constraints encompass institutional structures and arrangements, both of
which “define[] the national state, its relation to federal subjects, and its relation to the
ultimate sovereign, the people.”40 Finally, level-three constraints are the values—
political, cultural, and ideological—that serve to buttress the federal system. Though
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It will always be far more easy for the
State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon
the State authorities.”); 31:198 (Hamilton: “It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State
governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to
encroach upon the rights of the State governments.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 310 (James Madison) (“We
have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually
betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual
capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. . .[A]s the States will retain, under the
proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly
disregarded.”).
38. See MIKHAIL FILIPPOV, PETER C. ORDESHOOK, & OLGA SHVETSOVA, DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A
THEORY OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 33-41 (2004).
39. Id. at 36.
40. Id.
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Filippov et al. focus on the operation of these values in elites, I follow Sanford Levinson
and, as we shall see in Part II, James Madison in interpreting these level-three
protections as being constitutionally grounded in the people.41 Employing these
distinctions, we can address the second question concerning specific protections
provided by the Constitution. The balance of this Part focuses on the first two levels,
while Part II addresses level-three protections.
1. Level One: Explicit Bargains
Just as dividing state from federal powers cannot be an exact science,
distinguishing level-one from level-two protections can at times be challenging because
textual exhortations often accompany structural guidelines, and institutional
arrangements frequently incorporate a textual promise. Moreover, as Filippov et al. note,
level-two protections serve in part to sustain level-one promises: “no Level I clause or
provision can be of much consequence unless fortified by a second level of rules and
procedures.”42 Nonetheless, several level-one protections can be identified in the
Constitution. The first, which has already been discussed, is the Article VI Supremacy
Clause. There we see the declaration that the Constitution and federal law are supreme,
though no structural provisions accompany that claim. The clause stops short of
“confer[ring] authority on any specific level or branch to say definitively what the
Constitution meant when disputes arose.”43 Another such protection is offered by the
Tenth Amendment, which states that all powers not delegated or prohibited are reserved
to the states or to the people.44 Because I discuss this amendment at greater length in the
following section, it will suffice for present purposes simply to note that it serves only a
declaratory, as opposed to directly institutional or procedural, purpose.
The Preamble to the Constitution could plausibly serve as a level-one constraint as
well. An argument to this effect would hold that the Preamble articulates the ends for
which the national government was established and, as such, should guide the
interpretation of national powers vis-à-vis state powers. Finally, a set of level-one
protections can arguably be found in the grants of “legislative,” “executive,” and
“judicial” powers in the opening sections of Articles I, II, and III, respectively. On this
argument, these grants of power would be understood to identify the types of power of
which national power partakes and would invite distinctions between these national
powers and the parallel but distinct powers of the several states. But defending this
argument, along with level-one justifications for the other examples cited, requires
41. See pp. infra 704-10.
42. FILIPPOV ET AL., supra note 38, at 73; see also infra pp. 723-25.
43. Purcell, supra note 26, at 141. Purcell goes on to argue that the Oath Clause (U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3)
“rather plausibly suggested that all [state and federal officials] were equally responsible for interpreting and
enforcing the new charter. Such a compromise promised little but future contestation. Id.
44. By similar logic, the Ninth Amendment serves as a level-one constraint on the federal system. Making
this argument, however, requires a fair amount of historical exposition and more space than is available here.
For the most developed versions of this argument, see KURT LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT (2009) and The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801 (2008).
Lash’s argument for the federalism-regarding purposes of the Ninth Amendment poses a sharp challenge to its
principal application in American constitutional law—privacy jurisprudence. For Lash’s engagement with this
issue, see Inkblot: The Ninth Amendment as Textual Justification for Judicial Enforcement of the Right to
Privacy, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 219 (2013).
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resources beyond those supplied by the Constitution’s text alone. That is, it requires
precisely the kind of structural and relational inference that Charles Black observed was
largely forsaken in American constitutional law. And though there are strong arguments
for the constitutional significance of the provisions cited here, the fact remains that they
have been frequently neglected in favor of provisions that are either more clearly
directive or minimize the degree of inferential reasoning required to reach an
authoritative conclusion.45
2. Level Two: Institutions
It was precisely this weakness of level-one protections that motivated Madison’s
argument against “parchment barriers” in Federalist 48. Rather than rely on mere textual
declarations, “which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most
of the American constitutions,” it was necessary to devise “some more adequate
defense . . . for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the
government.”46 As regards the federal system, such defenses come in the form of at least
four level-two constraints: the rules of representation in the national legislature, the
federal courts, state management of federal elections, and the state militia power.
Starting with the first of these, the so-called Great Compromise reached at the
Convention brought a mix of proportional and state-based representation to the national
government. In the House of Representatives the rule of representation was “People-asUnion,” according to which the Union was defined as a popular constituency.47 On this
rule, the national “People” was the object of representation. The rule in the Senate was
“States-as-Union,” by which the states were identified as the units of representation.
Consequently, the representation of individual citizens in the upper chamber was tied to
their status as citizens of the several states, and not primarily as members of a national
constituency. The equal representation of the states is buttressed by the guarantee, in
Article V, that “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate.” The Senate’s advice and consent powers on presidential appointments and
treaties serve also to ostensibly inflect these exercises of national power with the input of
the states.
45. Of the provisions discussed here, the clearest example of this phenomenon is probably the Preamble,
with the Tenth Amendment being a close second. The least clear example is ostensibly the Supremacy Clause,
as ubiquitous as it is in the case law treating conflicts between state and federal laws. But even these instances
illustrate the point advanced here. For it is rarely enough to simply point to the Supremacy Clause as
conclusive proof of a federal law’s legitimacy. Instead, the clause is often cited as a trump card, played after it
has been shown that the federal law in question was a legitimate exercise of a national power, which in turn
requires recourse to more clearly directive provisions.
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333 (James Madison).
47. It is important, though, to note the significance of the states here too, as state boundaries still structure
the apportionment of House seats and, as a result, House districts. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2 & amend. XIV, §
2. This point is made by Michael W. McConnell in The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 111 (2000-2001). (“But even the House of Representatives,
the members of which supposedly represent ‘the People,’ not states, flunks the ‘one person, one vote’ test.”).
Hence, it is understandable why this point would increase in salience in direct proportion to the emphasis on
meeting the standard—set out in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)—of “one person, one vote.” See also
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81(1963). Nonetheless, the distinction between the States-as-Union and the
People-as-Union still stands because it rests on the presence or absence of mediation between citizens and their
representatives, not the relative weight of citizens’ votes for their representatives. My thanks to Mariah
Zeisberg for pressing this point.
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The combination of rules of representation in Congress meant that the national
legislative process would, in effect, model a virtual negotiation between the two objects
of federal representation: the national People and the several states. Though the Senate is
arguably the most significant component of state influence in the national government, it
is important to recognize the ways in which undue state influence was avoided. Three
such features that are commonly cited are the state legislatures’ lack of power to recall
senators and control senatorial salaries (both of which would have enabled them to
punish disobedience or non-cooperation), as well as the Senate’s six-year term of office
(which meant that many senators would be in office longer than the state officials that
appointed them).48
Second, the Constitution grants to the states the power to manage national
elections. According to Section 2 of Article I, the qualifications for voting in elections
for the House of Representatives are determined by the states’ qualifications for their
most numerous legislative branch. Until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,
state legislatures were also empowered to choose the senators that would represent
them.49 Though the states were given the power to determine the “Times, Places, and
Manner” of elections for the House and Senate, the Constitution also granted Congress
the power to “make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing
Senators.”50 As regards the election of the president, Article III empowers the state
legislatures to determine how their electors will be appointed. Though these provisions
have been altered significantly over the course of American history—most notable by the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments—the states nonetheless retain the
power and autonomy to significantly influence the election of national representatives.
The third level-two protection is the federal judiciary, which is endowed by Article
III with the “judicial Power of the United States” and, by implication from the
Supremacy Clause, is empowered to enforce the state-federal relationship established by
the Constitution. However, the efficacy of this protection for preserving state power
depends on the degree to which the Constitution determinately defines the federal
system. For if there is, as I have argued, a non-negligible degree of underdeterminacy,
the federal judiciary’s power to police the boundaries of that federal system merely begs
the question of what those boundaries are. From the standpoint of state power this
concern is enhanced by the fact that, despite its powers of enforcement, the judiciary is
still a national judiciary. Unlike the system proposed by the New Jersey Plan, according
to which state courts would have effectively served as the lower federal courts, the
Constitution gives the national government full control—from appointment to
confirmation to salary—over the federal judiciary. The very same reasons that underlay
the Anti-Federalist opposition to the Senate could be applied to the federal court system.
As Alison LaCroix convincingly argues in her study of the origins of American
federalism, through its rejection of Madison’s proposed national veto and subsequent
adoption of the Supremacy Clause, the Convention opted for a markedly judicial

48. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE
311 (2012).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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resolution of conflicts over the federal system.51 To the extent the federal judiciary
expressed the views of the governmental level of which it was a part, the courts offered
little comfort to those skeptical of the protections the Constitution offered to state
autonomy and power.
The fourth, and for our purposes final, level-two constraint on the federal bargain
is the states’ ability, implied by several provisions of the Constitution, to maintain a
militia. Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to “call[] forth the Militia” and to
“provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining” it when called into the “Service of the
United States.” Additionally, Article III identifies the president as the Commander in
Chief not only of the “Army and Navy of the United States,” but “of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” And, of course,
there is the Second Amendment, which prefaces its recognition of the right of the people
to keep and bear arms with the enigmatic declaration, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State.” Though these provisions grant the national
government some measure of control over the state militias and clearly foresee some
possible form of cooperative relationship, the more important point is that they recognize
the very existence of state militias, implicitly condoning the continuation of these statebased military forces. Indeed, far from repudiating the role of violence in the federal
system, the Second Amendment goes as far as to underscore the legitimacy of armed
resistance in defense of freedom. Taken together, the constitutional provisions
recognizing the state militia power identify armed resistance as not only a possible but
also a licit recourse in event of federal overreach. And, like so much else in the
Constitution, the definitions of the terms on which the use of the militia power would
depend are left unelaborated.
C. Interlude: The States’ Rights Amendment?
Given its legal and historical importance for claims of state power, the Tenth
Amendment merits separate consideration. The traditional constitutional prooftext for
states’ rights claims,52 the Tenth Amendment can plausibly be read to preclude (or at
least significantly weaken) the argument for federal underdeterminacy that I have
advanced. In this regard, two points are relevant. The first is that, for all the rhetorical
fodder the amendment can provide advocates of state power, it actually does nothing to
clarify the specific dimensions of the state-federal relationship. In fact, consistent with
my analysis of the constitutional logic of federalism, by recognizing “powers not
delegated . . . nor prohibited”53 it acknowledges that there are aspects of the state-federal
relationship that are not captured by the Constitution’s text. Moreover, as Levinson
argues, the amendment “provides no clue at all as to what precisely is assigned to the
national government or prohibited to the states.”54 This recognition in no way clarifies
51. ALISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 132-74 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding unconstitutional the Fair Labor
Standards Act as applied to state employees); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding the
“take title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act unconstitutional for, in
part, violating the Tenth Amendment).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
54. LEVINSON, supra note 48, at 309.
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the extent—to say nothing of the scope of legitimate application—of federal powers
granted by the Constitution, which would seem to be the true ground of contention in
debates that center on the Tenth Amendment.
The second point concerns the significance of the amendment’s final clause. After
recognizing that there are powers beyond those delegated to the national government and
prohibited to the states, the amendment concludes that those undefined powers “are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” While most arguments in the states’
rights vein place emphasis on the reservation to the states, it must be remembered that
those undefined powers are also reserved to the people. The addition of “the people” to
the analysis of the state-federal relationship not only underscores the popular basis of
republican government; it also foregrounds—but does not resolve—the question of
where the people stand in relation to both levels of government. For example, the
meaning would be quite different if the amendment concluded with “reserved to the
States respectively, that is to the people,” a formulation that would have equated the
people in their political capacity with the states. Similarly, it could have read “reserved
to the States respectively, and not to the people,” which would have implied that the
division of power is a zero-sum enterprise, with every addition to national power coming
at the expense of an otherwise state-possessed power.
Both of those alternative formulations are markedly different from what the Tenth
Amendment actually says, what it means, and the political realities it underscores. For
Joseph Story, the amendment served as “a mere affirmation of what, upon any just
reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting the constitution.”55 As he argues in his
Commentaries,
Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it follows
irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the
state authorities, if invested by their constitutions of government
respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is retained BY THE
56
PEOPLE, as a part of their residuary sovereignty.
Here, Story emphatically identifies the people as the foundation of political power,
the ultimate sovereign who in a federal system delegates all political power.57 On this
reading, the Tenth Amendment pays homage to Madison’s arguments in Federalist 37
and 46 by gesturing towards the people’s role in shaping the contours of the state-federal
relationship. But the addition of the people to the state-federal equation raises a host of
55. Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH A PRELIMINARY
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION III: 752 (1991 [1833]).
56. Id. (emphasis in original). Significantly, this passage is followed by a discussion of the nature of powers
delegated to government. After recounting the efforts in Congress to add the word “expressly” to the original
draft of the Tenth Amendment, Story writes, “On that occasion it was remarked, that it is impossible to confine
a government to the exercise of express powers. There must necessarily be admitted powers by implication,
unless the constitution descended to the most minute details. It is a general principle, that all corporate bodies
possess all powers incident to a corporate capacity, without being absolutely expressed.” Id. at 752-53.
57. See James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 8:18 (arguing
that denying the people the ability to delegate power to the general government is tantamount to allowing the
subordinate States “to dictate to their superiors . . . to the majesty of the people”).
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further questions. Where do the people fit into the process by which the state-federal line
is contested? How does the presence of two fundamentally different governments affect
the political meaning of a decision to support one over the other? What does it even
mean in a federal system to choose one government over the other? It is to these
questions that I now turn.
III.

THE RELATIONSHIPS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Thus far we have seen that the constitutional division between state and federal
powers was underdeterminate and that, as a result, the precise contours of the statefederal relationship were subject to contestation and change. But, we must now ask, why
does it matter? Put more precisely, what is it that makes this underdeterminacy and
relational contestation relevant to an inquiry into the nature and development of the
federal system? Answering this question takes us from the first component of our
analysis, the structure and institutional arrangement of the federal system, to the second
component, the relationships between the two levels of government and their citizens.
Those relationships are the subject of this part of the Essay. I begin with a discussion of
what Sanford Levinson has called the “political sociology” of federalism, focusing
specifically on the concept of “attachment” in Publius’s arguments in behalf of the
Constitution.58 In the second section, I broaden the focus to inquire into the substance of
the Anti-Federalists’ treatment of attachment. Taken together, these two sections reveal
that, despite important differences concerning the nature of attachment, Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike saw it as a crucial component of the underdeterminate federal
system. Whereas Federalists acknowledged citizens’ prevailing attachment to state
governments and argued that it was an important, though not inalterable, limit on federal
power, Anti-Federalists feared that the creation of a national government would provide
a new object of attachment whose very presence would undermine state power, over time
leading to a consolidated government.
A. Level Three: The Political Sociology of Federalism
Even before Publius published the first Federalist essay, the Convention’s
proposal was attacked for presenting to the people a “consolidated government,” that is,
one “whose natural, perhaps inevitable tendency would be to annihilate the state
governments or reduce them to insignificance.”59 Typical of this genre of critique is The
Federal Farmer’s contention in his first essay, where he argues,
The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to
change, in time, our condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen
republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one

58. See LEVINSON, supra note 48, at 318; see also Sanford V. Levinson, Union and States’ Rights 150
Years after Sumter: Some Reflections on a Tangled Political and Constitutional Conundrum, in UNION &
STATES’ RIGHTS: A HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF INTERPOSITION, NULLIFICATION, AND SECESSION 150
YEARS AFTER SUMTER (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2013),
59. Chapter 8 Introduction, THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION (last visited Apr. 10, 2016), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8I.html.
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consolidated government. . . . The plan proposed appears to be partly
federal, but principally however, calculated ultimately to make the
states one consolidated government.60
This fear was echoed in the essays of Brutus,61 Agrippa,62 and the Impartial
Examiner,63 as well as Robert Yates and John Lansing’s letter to the governor of New
York, “Objections to the Federal Constitution.”64 It was also a common critique in the
state ratifying conventions. For example, in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, John
Smilie argued that “it is fair and reasonable to infer, that it was in contemplation of the
framers of this system, to absorb and abolish the efficient sovereignty and independent
power of the several States, in order to invigorate and aggrandize the general
government.”65 In Virginia’s convention, Patrick Henry made the same argument,
illustrated by reference to the Constitution’s opening claim to speak in the name of a
single national People:
I rose yesterday to ask a question, which arose in my own mind. When
I was asked the question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation
was obvious: The fate of this question and America may depend on
this: Have they said, we the States? Have they made a proposal of a
compact between States? If they had, it would be a confederation: It is
otherwise most clearly a consolidated government.66
In short, the debate over the Constitution quickly coalesced around the fear that, in
either the short or the long term, the power of the states would be eroded while that of
the national government would increase pari passu.
How could Publius respond to this accusation? Early in The Federalist, Hamilton
engaged the consolidation charge, arguing that the federal government’s attempt to usurp
the powers of the states “would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory.”67 But his
argument in behalf of the Constitution ultimately rested on conjecture about the
disposition of national representatives—“I confess I am at a loss to discover what
temptation the persons intrusted [sic] with the administration of the general government
could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description.”68 Later in The
Federalist Madison identified the national and federal components of the “compound

60. Federal Farmer no. 1, 1 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 8:12 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s12.html.
61. See, e.g., Brutus, Nos. 1 &11, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 108-17, 162-67 (Herbert Storing ed., 1985).
62. See, e.g., Agrippa, Nos. 4 & 6, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 234-36, 238-40 (Herbert Storing ed., 1985).
63. See The Impartial Examiner, No. 1, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 286-91 (Herbert Storing ed., 1985).
64. Robert Yates & John Lansing, Yates and Lansing’s Letter, 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480-482 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863).
65. John Smilie, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 8:16, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s16.html.
66. Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratifying Convention, 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 8:38, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s38.html.
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, 98 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
68. Id. at 97-98.
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republic” (Federalist 37), explained how the proposed Constitution conformed to
republican principles (Federalist 39), and provided a general defense of the powers
delegated to the national government (Federalist 41-43). Nonetheless, as the excerpt
from The Federal Farmer attests, fears of consolidation persisted. And so in Federalist
45 and 46, Madison presents his case for why states will have the advantage over the
national government, rendering the Anti-Federalists’ charges of consolidation baseless.
The lynchpin of Madison’s argument is found in Federalist 46, where he writes,
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion,
seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural
attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective
States. Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals
will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices
and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the
more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated
and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more
familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these,
will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on
the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected
most strongly to incline.69
The conceptual anchor of this argument is Madison’s emphasis on the “attachment
of the people,” a relationship of familiarity, connection, and trust that will prevent the
national government from encroaching on the states.
Sanford Levinson has described Madison’s argument in Federalist 46 as “one of
political sociology and not one based on the raw text of the Constitution, which scarcely
supports in an unequivocal way a reading of significantly limited national powers.”70 He
presents Madison’s argument about attachment as maintaining “ordinary citizens will
naturally identify with their state governments and view the national government as a
fairly remote, and possibly mistrusted, entity.”71 In other words, relative to the national
government, the state governments will be larger, better known to the people, and more
able to directly benefit more people than the national government. As such, they will be
the objects of their trust and allegiance. The people will identify with their state
governments and, for that reason, they will resist attempts to transfer power to the
relatively unknown and remote federal government.
In evaluating Madison’s argument in No. 46, it is critically important to recognize
the basis for his contention that states needn’t fear consolidation. Rather than rest his
argument on Filoppovian level-one or level-two protections of the federal bargain, like
those discussed in Part I, Madison invoked level-three protections: the cultural and
ideological values of the people. Of the five state advantages over the federal
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
70. Sanford Levinson, Union and States’ Rights, supra note 58, at 246 (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 319.
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government that he identified in Federalist 45, three were rooted in the sentiments or
commitments of the people: “the weight of personal influence,” “the predilection and
probable support of the people,” and “the disposition and faculty of resisting and
frustrating the measures of each other.”72 Incidentally, the remaining two—”the
immediate dependence of the one on the other” and “the powers respectively vested in
them”—are directly connected to the degree of determinacy of the federal system, which,
in light of my argument in Part I, would call into question how strong these state
advantages actually are.
At the end of the day, Madison argued, constitutional text and institutional design
only go so far. Within the broad parameters established by the Constitution, many of the
details of the state-federal relationship depend on which government enjoys the
attachment of the people. And precisely because there is underdeterminacy in the federal
system, the people are able to choose which government to trust, or, put slightly
differently, which government to entrust with the power to act on its behalf. In this way,
underdeterminacy supplies the conditions necessary for the people’s attachment to be
politically consequential. As Josh Chafetz has argued, “the balance of powers between
the federal government and the states must remain to some degree indeterminate. If there
is no indeterminacy, then there is no possibility for conflict; and if there is no possibility
for conflict, then there is no opportunity for the people to choose their champion.”73
Because there is indeterminacy, conflict is inevitable; and because conflict is inevitable,
the people will be able to choose to which government to attach itself. Accordingly, the
national and state governments will act where the people deem proper, and the statefederal relationship will reflect these determinations. Federal underdeterminacy and the
variable constitutional authority resulting from the people’s attachment are reciprocal
features of the American federal system.74
Though Levinson identifies only Federalist 46 in his discussion of the political
sociology of American federalism, the concept and consequences of the “attachment of
the people” pervade The Federalist. In his seminal study, The Political Philosophy of
The Federalist, David Epstein connects the notion of attachment to Madison’s discussion
in Federalist 37 of the “proper line of partition” between the state and federal
governments, arguing that that line would be “determined by the degree to which the
people are or become attached to one or the other.”75 Epstein grounds Madison’s
contention that the states will have the advantage over the national government to, at
least in part, an argument made in Federalist 17. There Hamilton identifies the states’
“administration of criminal and civil justice” as the source of the “one transcendent

72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 288 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
73. Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L. J. 1084, 1093
(2011) (Chafetz’s use of indeterminate is synonymous with underdeterminate as it’s used in this Essay). See
supra note 14 (noting the distinction between underdeterminate and indeterminate in the relevant legal
philosophic literature).
74. Variable constitutional authority along these lines is a central emphasis of Mariah Zeisberg’s work; see
supra note 14; see also Zeisberg, Constitutional Fidelity and Interbranch Conflict, 13 THE GOOD SOCIETY 2430 (Dec. 2004). For a similar, though ultimately distinct, notion of variable authority, see Wayne Moore,
Variable Constitutional Authority: Madisonian Founding Perspectives, 2 AMER. POL. THOUGHT 217 (2013).
75. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 52.
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advantage belonging to the province of the State governments.”76 Not only is the states’
administration of justice carried out in close physical proximity to the people, it is also
responsible for the protection of their lives and property. Both of these considerations
would serve to remind the people of the importance, even necessity, of their state
governments.
But, as one might expect knowing Hamilton’s confidence in an energetic national
government, there is more to this argument than is perhaps apparent on the first reading.
For in the course of his assurances that states will benefit more than the federal
government from the people’s attachment, he identifies the principal qualification to the
states’ advantage. After asserting that affections decrease “in proportion to the distance
or diffusiveness of the object,” he concludes that local governments will be the object of
the people’s stronger bias.77 But appended to that conclusion is a vitally important
condition: “unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better
administration of the latter [i.e., the government of the Union].”78 Thus Hamilton not
only opens the door to the possibility that the people’s attachment may shift to the new
national government, he also identifies the process by which that shift can happen. The
national government can, in effect, win over the people by doing well what it is charged
with doing. Ten essays later, Hamilton again picks up this line of reasoning, candidly
admitting that many of the Federalist essays have presented “reasons . . . to induce a
probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular
governments.”79 And because there is no justification for the opinion that the general
government will be administered worse than the state governments, “there seems to be
no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people.”80 In
other words, there is no reason to believe that the national government could not outperform the state governments and, in so doing, attract the attachment of the people.
While it is true that the people’s extant attachments to the states could persist, a
beneficial and, in time, respected national government could change that. And with that
change could come theretofore uncontemplated exercises of national power.81
B. Attachment and the Anti-Federalist Fear of Consolidation
Lest one get the impression that Publius’s treatment of attachment is a function
more of an idiosyncratic or biased (collective) mind than of broader conceptual
importance, we can also look to the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. Recourse
to the Anti-Federalists is helpful also for emphasizing that the argument I am advancing
is neither an argument about original intent nor one that unnecessarily privileges the
76. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 17, 99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 27:159-160.
80. Id. at 27:159.
81. Given Publius’s anonymity at the time of publication, it wasn’t likely that the authors’ arguments would
be interpreted through the specific lens of their reputations or, as in the case of Madison and Hamilton, known
antipathy towards state governments. But it is nonetheless remarkable that in an essay (which itself is part of a
larger enterprise) devoted to convincing skeptics of the Constitution’s merits, Publius forthrightly
acknowledged the logical implications of the argument about attachment and the potentialities of the federal
system.
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writings of a single individual (Madison) or writer (Publius). Rather, it seeks to
understand the political system established and the regime inaugurated by the
Constitution, and cites as illustration and support those who “saw best and farthest.”82
Indeed, when we look to the Anti-Federalists we find a more nuanced and compelling
understanding of attachment than is presented in The Federalist. And for good reason.
While Publius’s discussions were concerned only with stasis—the peoples’ attachments
were and would remain with their state governments—writers like The Federal Farmer,
Brutus, and Agrippa were forced to deal with the possibility of choice presented by the
proposed Constitution. With the addition of another government that acted directly on
individuals, state governments would have to compete for the peoples’ allegiances and
would always be under threat of losing their attachment. Accordingly, they were forced
to argue developmentally, painting a picture not only of what the Constitution would do
in the short term but also of what kind of regime it would create over the long run. For
this reason, while the variability of constitutional authority is implied in Publius’s
treatment of attachment, it is a central concern of the Anti-Federalist critique of the
federal system established by the Convention.83
We can begin to understand the Anti-Federalist notion of attachment by identifying
an important area of common ground they shared with the Federalists. Both groups saw
the attachment of the people as a central concern of statecraft and, by extension, as a
crucial determinant of the contours of the state-federal relationship. Thus, for example,
John Smilie’s argument that “the attachment of the citizens to their government and its
laws is founded upon the benefits which they derive from them” parallels Hamilton’s
argument in The Federalist about attachment following the quality of government
administration.84 Additionally, Brutus’s claim that every government must be supported
either by force or “by the people having such an attachment to it” is echoed by
Madison’s pairing in Federalist 46 of attachment and the power to maintain a militia as
guarantors of state autonomy.85 Finally, there is Centinel’s belief that “time and habit”
give “stability and attachment . . . to forms of government,”86 which mirrors Madison’s
belief, expressed at the Convention, that attachments of association and knowledge

82. GORDON WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES 128
(2011). I cite this characterization well aware that Wood believes it was the Anti-Federalists, and not the
Federalists, who best understood the political world to come and the consequences of the constitutional regime
they opposed. Indeed, as I argue below, seeing farthest was not only a substantive merit of much AntiFederalist argumentation; it was also a practical necessity. See infra pp. 699-700.
83. Though beyond the scope of this essay, it should at least be noted that a comprehensive assessment of
the relevance of attachment to the understanding of the Convention’s proposal would have to connect both
Publius’s and the Anti-Federalists’ arguments back to the records of the federal convention. A cursory review
of the Convention proceedings only underscores the discussion presented here, and several relevant episodes
from the Convention are thus adduced. It also reveals that, in contrast to (many of) the ratification debates,
attachment frequently appears in connection with the question of what influences the allegiances of
representatives and how political structures and requirements can exploit or avoid those influences as desired.
See, e.g., Debate of the Federal Convention (Aug. 9, 1787), 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 230-42
(Max Farrand ed., 1937).
84. John Smilie, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 8:16 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2016), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s16.html.
85. Brutus, No. 4, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 129 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985); see also Federal Farmer,
No. 28, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
86. Centinel, No. 1, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 14 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
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constitute a government’s “greatest strength and support.”87 Examples could be
multiplied further, but these suffice to establish the point that for Federalists and AntiFederalists alike, the attachment of the people was a deeply consequential component of
the design and operation of government.
But here, as elsewhere, the two groups disagreed in the particulars. The Federalists
saw attachment as a function of effective governance, which had been undermined by the
state governments so beloved by the Anti-Federalists. As Herbert Storing has described
this position, “[a] government that can actually accomplish its resolves, that can keep the
peace, protect property, and promote the prosperity of the country, will be a government
respected and obeyed by its citizens.”88 But for the Anti-Federalists, attachment was the
product of support freely given, of a confidence borne of knowledge of and proximity to
one’s governors. The extended republic proposed by the Constitution threatened the
ability of individuals to gain such knowledge by increasing the distance between them
and their government. Accordingly, it threatened the possibility that attachment could be
freely given. This was, to the Anti-Federalist mind, a critical defect of the Constitution
because there was only one alternative to voluntary attachment: force.89
Thus we see in the Anti-Federalist critique an almost constant pairing of voluntary
attachment and the coercive force of a central government, framed by the argument that
the extended republic undermines the prerequisites of voluntary attachment. We have
already seen the thrust of Brutus’s argument on this point, but its centrality to his
opposition to the Constitution merits further attention. In his first essay he writes,
Men who, upon the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute
the laws, are influenced to do it either by affection to the government,
or from fear; where a standing army is at hand to punish offenders,
every man is actuated by the latter principle, and therefore, when the
magistrate calls, will obey. . . . The body of the people being attached,
the government will always be sufficient to support and execute its
laws, and to operate upon the fears of any faction which may be
opposed to it, not only to prevent an opposition to the execution of the
laws themselves, but also to compel the most of them to aid the
magistrate; but the people will not be likely to have such confidence in
their rulers, in a republic so extensive as the United States, as
necessary for these purposes.90
Obedience by force or voluntary attachment—those are the two available sources
for the support and assistance that all governments depend on to implement their laws.
87. Robert Yates, Notes from the Federal Convention (June 23, 1787), in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 391, 392 (Max Farrand ed. 1937) (quoting James Madison) (emphasizing the conceptual and
linguistic commonalities between the authors of The Federalist and others).
88. Herbert Storing, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE
OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 43 (2008).
89. Id. at 16 (identifying three “fundamental considerations” that underlie the defects of the large republic.
Its inability to “enjoy a voluntary attachment of the people to the government and a voluntary obedience to the
laws” is listed first).
90. Brutus, No. 1, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 115 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
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But, as Richard Henry Lee argued, a consolidated nation “cannot be governed in
freedom.” Whereas at the state level, “opinion founded on the knowledge of those who
govern, procures obedience without force,” the extended republic obliterates that opinion
by diminishing the requisite knowledge, “and force then becomes necessary to secure the
purposes of civil government.”91
We have seen that the Anti-Federalists’ treatment of attachment is a constitutive
part of a broader critique of the extended republic. But the burden of my argument is to
show that their treatment of attachment is bound up in the nature of the federal system;
that is, that their critique is not just about the size of the nation to be governed by the
Constitution, but also the structure of the federal system proposed to govern it. To the
opponents of the Constitution, it was clear that the federal system as structured by the
Constitution fundamentally changed the economy of attachment. Where there was once
voluntary attachment to a known and physically proximate government, there would be a
transactional attachment—an allegiance rooted in the things government does and
provides—with a far-off government. Moreover, the federal system changed the calculus
of attachment. In addition to trafficking in another currency of allegiance, the mere
existence of an additional layer of government would destabilize the states by offering an
exit option. If states did not merit the support of their citizens, under the Constitution the
latter could punish the former not only by electing national-level representatives to
assume erstwhile state duties but also by electing state-level representatives more
favorable to national power or policies. States would now have to compete for the
people’s support, and they would have to do so on the national government’s terms.
I conclude with a brief comment on the relationship between the substance and
practical imperatives of the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. Reading the
Anti-Federalist response to the Convention’s proposal, one is struck by its predictive,
almost prophetic tones. Theirs was an appraisal not so much about what the Constitution
does in the immediate or short term as it was an attempt to understand and describe what
the Constitution would do—to the citizen, the government, and the regime. They were
acutely aware that “the Constitution is much more than a constitution of government,”92
that it would define both the ends towards which government was oriented and the
means by which those ends would be pursued; as a result, it would constitute the people
as much as their government. They saw not only the alterations to American governance
posed by the Constitution, but the subsequent changes that those alterations would beget.
Hence, they argued not that ratification of the Constitution would immediately institute a
consolidated government but that it was “calculated ultimately to make the states one
consolidated government,”93 and that, “although the government reported by the
convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to
it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”94 The Federalists, on
the other hand, faced a different imperative–to assure those skeptical of national power

91. STORING, supra note 88, at 17 (2008) (quoting Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Aug.
8, 1789)).
92. Barber, supra note 9, at 174.
93. Federal Farmer, No. 1, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 37 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
94. Brutus, supra note 90, at 110.
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that the Constitution did not create an unnecessarily powerful federal government.
Accordingly, they focused on the many things that the Constitution would not
immediately change, foremost among which was the vast body of state powers that, for
reasons of popular attachment and government capacity, would for the time being remain
with the states. It was left to the Anti-Federalists to identify and explain how even those
could in time be changed by the government proposed by the Constitution.
IV.

“BASIC PRINCIPLES” RECONSIDERED

The underdeterminacy of the federal system, expressed in both the structures and
relationships of federal sovereignty, means that the meaning of the state-federal
relationship is contested, defined, and renegotiated through constitutional politics. As
Keith Whittington has argued, federalism is “a continuing tension contained within, and
created by, the founding document. Partly because of that ambiguity, the resolution of
that tension is a political, and not merely a legal task that has fallen on subsequent
generations.”95 This insight has deep roots in American political and legal thought. As
John Marshall observed in McCulloch v. Maryland, “the question respecting the extent
of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise,
so long as our system shall exist.”96 Though the parameters of the state-federal
relationship are established by the Constitution, the answer to the fundamental question
of political sovereignty—who gets to decide?—is a function of the episodic resolution of
the structural and relational underdeterminacies inherent in American federalism.
According to the understanding I have advanced in this Essay, the federal system
structures debates over sovereignty and, as a result, comprises a fundamental disharmony
in the constitutional order. Gary Jacobsohn has defined these disharmonies as latent
tensions rooted in the polity’s institutional arrangements, intellectual and political
traditions, value commitments, and aspirations. “Unlike structures such as houses,” he
writes, “constitutions . . . are in decisive ways characterized by disharmony, a condition
that generates a dialogical process that may result in changes in identity that, however
significant, only rarely culminate in a wholesale transformation of the constitution.”97
The argument of this Essay has been that in the American federal system this dialogical
process takes place between governmental institutions and between governments and
their citizens.
Federal underdeterminacy was in part the result of a commitment to resolve deep
divisions through the political process and to allow for changes over time in the division
between state and federal power. However, though courts “could not reduce the relevant
constitutional principles to legal precision,” the lesson of American political history is
that they have nonetheless exercised interpretive dominance in this domain.98 And this is
very much the consequence of our constitutional design, which explicitly rejected a
95. Keith Whittington, The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification
Debate as an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change, 26 PUBLIUS 1, 1 (1996).
96. 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
97. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 325-26 (2010).
98. Whittington, supra note 95, at 7. See KEITH WHITTINGTON, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(2009) (discussing the origins and rise of judicial supremacy).
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legislative resolution of federalism questions in favor of a markedly (though not
exclusively) judicial resolution.99 By now, the tension between the determinacy of
judicial reasoning and interpretation, on the one hand, and federal underdeterminacy, on
the other, should be apparent. Nonetheless, applying the argument I have advanced in
this Essay to a concrete case can further illustrate its central claims. Moreover, the recent
political and legal battle over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
vividly illustrates the substantive implications of these claims. Accordingly, in this
section I critically evaluate the four “basic principles” identified in Chief Justice John
Roberts’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius100 to
demonstrate how the structural and relational considerations discussed in this Essay bear
on the Court’s decision to uphold the ACA’s Individual Mandate provision as a lawful
exercise of Congress’s taxing power, but not as a lawful exercise of its regulatory
authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause.101 As I endeavor to show, Roberts’s
articulation of the state-federal relationship entails the denial of the two fundamental
premises of the federal system that I have presented in this Essay—that the Constitution
established an underdeterminate relationship between the states and the national
government, and that the attachment of the people can play a crucial role in resolving (if
only temporarily) those underdeterminacies. While this is apparent in the first three
“basic principles,” it is especially clear, and especially consequential, in the fourth,
which concerned the use of the canon of constitutional avoidance to uphold the
Individual Mandate as a lawful use of Congress’s taxing power. Accordingly, I discuss
this canon at some length, offering a sustained critique of its use in Sebelius. I conclude
by sketching an alternative model of judicial review—processual review—that is
consistent with the structural and relational understanding of the federal system
presented in Parts I and II and yet distinct from the conception of review derived from
the most prominent process-based theories of federalism.
A. Four “Basic Principles” and Three Critiqued
Chief Justice Roberts begins his Sebelius opinion with an articulation of the “basic
principles” that form the background against which the questions presented in the case
must be considered. Though Roberts does not explicitly enumerate these principles, the
following four can be readily identified from his discussion:
“In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers;
the States and the people retain the remainder.”102

99. See LaCroix, supra note 51; Chafetz, supra note 73 (arguing that judicial resolution is not the only
constitutional means of resolving state-federal conflicts). See also Allison LaCroix, What if Madison Had
Won? Imagining a Constitutional World of Legislative Supremacy, 45 IND. L. REV. 41 (2011) (exploring the
possible political history of an American Republic with a national veto).
100. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-80 (2012).
101. Thus limited, my inquiry doesn’t address the other dimensions of the Court’s Sebelius decision. See
Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1 (2013)
(clarifying and explaining the many issues at play in the opinions).
102. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
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While “the Federal Government . . . must show that a constitutional grant of power
authorizes each of its actions . . .[t]he same does not apply to the States, because the
Constitution is not the source of their power.”103
“This case concerns two powers that the Constitution does grant the Federal
Government, but which must be read carefully to avoid creating a general federal
authority akin to the police power.”104
“Our permissive readings of [Congress’s enumerated] powers is explained in part
by a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders. . . . Our
deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in matters of law.”105
1. Principle (1): Limited Federal Powers
Roberts begins his analysis by quoting John Marshall’s observation in McCulloch
v. Maryland, noted at the outset of this Part, “that ‘the question respecting the extent of
the powers actually granted’ to the Federal Government ‘is perpetually arising, and will
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.’”106 But what for Marshall
was a reflection on the inevitable consequences of constitutional underdeterminacy is for
Roberts a license for judicial oversight and intervention. That this question will continue
to arise, Roberts argues, implies that some institution must provide an answer:
“Resolving this controversy requires us [i.e., the Judiciary] to examine both the limits of
the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing those boundaries.”107
Central to this argument is the conflation of two notions of limited governmental powers,
which conflation is occasioned by the “perpetually arising” questions posed by federal
underdeterminacy. Whereas Roberts’s formulation of Principle (1) cites the finite nature
of the federal government’s powers, his justification for judicial review cites the
restricted or bounded nature of those powers. Hence, federal underdeterminacy coupled
with a focus on the restrictions on government power furnishes the justification for
judicial policing of the “boundaries” of federal power.
As the language of Principle (1) suggests, Roberts’s analysis is headed straight for
the Tenth Amendment. After claiming that “the restrictions on government power
foremost in many Americans’ minds are likely to be affirmative prohibitions, such as
contained in the Bill of Rights,”108 he reminds the reader that the Constitution did not at
first include a Bill of Rights in part “because the Framers felt the enumeration of powers
sufficed to restrain the Government.”109 The Bill of Rights, Roberts argues, formalized
this understanding of enumerated powers: “And when the Bill of Rights was ratified, it
made express what the enumeration of powers necessarily implied: ‘The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 2578.
Id.
Id. at 2579.
Id. at 2577 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819)).
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
Id.
Id. at 2578.
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respectively, or to the people.’”110 One must assume, of course, that Roberts’s language
on this point (as elsewhere) is carefully chosen, which makes his choice of “made
express” more than a little suggestive. In crafting the Tenth Amendment, the First
Congress, led by Madison, “avoided anything that might revive the Articles of
Confederation’s stingy formula limiting the central government to powers ‘expressly’
enumerated.”111 As I argued above,112 the Tenth Amendment does nothing to make the
state-federal relationship any less underdeterminate than it already is. Indeed, it stands as
a testament to that underdeterminacy by acknowledging that the Constitution does not
provide an exhaustive division of power between the states and the federal government.
Moreover, nowhere in Roberts’s analysis does he address the role of the people in
determining the scope or location of government powers, which was a crucial
interpretive component for Joseph Story. Thus understood, Roberts’s description of the
Amendment must be read as an attempt to impose greater determinacy on the
constitutional text than it can plausibly bear.113
2. Principle (2): The States
Roberts’s discussion of the Tenth Amendment serves as a natural pivot point to an
invocation, via New York v. United States, of state sovereignty.114 Citing the states’
police powers, which entail local control of “the facets of government that touch on
citizens’ daily lives,” he writes, quoting Federalist 45, “The Framers thus ensured that
powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people’ were held by governments more local and more accountable
than a distant federal bureaucracy.” As I explained earlier, Federalist 45 is one of two
essays (along with No. 46) in which Madison addresses the Anti-Federalists’
consolidation charge, arguing that the states will “have the advantage of the federal
Government.”115 But the nature of that advantage is crucially important. In Nos. 45 and
46, Madison identifies a host of considerations intended to show that the proposed
Constitution could not result in a consolidated government. Those considerations, I have
argued, fall into two categories. First, there are structural relationships that are
themselves subject to the underdeterminacy of the federal system—”the immediate
110. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
111. AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 320 (2005) (emphasis in original). See also
AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 119-124 (1998); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
112. See THE FEDERALIST, supra notes 19-21.
113. It is impossible to resist noting the echo of Hammer v. Dagenhart in Roberts’s use of “made express.”
There Justice Day wrote the Tenth Amendment’s excluded “expressly” back into the Constitution, arguing that,
“In interpreting the Constitution, it must never be forgotten that the Nation is made up of States to which are
entrusted the powers of local government. And to them and to the people the powers not expressly delegated to
the National Government are reserved” 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918) (emphasis added). In response to both Day
and Roberts, it will suffice to cite not just the text of the Tenth Amendment but also James Madison’s
observation in Congress on Aug. 18, 1789, in the face of an attempt to include “expressly” in the amendment
draft: “It was impossible to confine a Government to the exercise of express powers; there must necessarily be
admitted powers by implication, unless the constitution descended to recount every minutia.” See ANNALS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), I:790.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000).
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 311 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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dependence of the one [government] on the other” and “the powers respectively vested in
them.”116 And second, there are contingent political realities that depend on the capacity,
size, and respectability of the federal government, all of which influence the people’s
attachment thereto—”the weight of personal influence,” “the predilection and probable
support of the people,” and “the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the
measures of each other.”117 Madison’s characterization of the “powers reserved to the
several States” that Roberts cites in his discussion of Principle (2) is far from the
articulation of a principle of constitutional design. Rather, it is an appraisal of the current
state of popular opinion and government capacity that yields the conclusion that there are
natural limits, alongside but independent of constitutional limits, on the power of the
federal government. We hear nothing in Roberts’s treatment of state power about the
variability of the people’s attachment, to say nothing of the argument in The Federalist
that the federal government would likely be a more efficient administrator than the states
and, as a result, further attract the people’s confidences and support.118 To generalize
Madison’s observation of practical politics to a principle of constitutional design requires
an extension of reasoning unsupported by the logic of either The Federalist or, more
importantly, the Constitution.
Furthermore, Roberts’s citation of Federalist 45 is somewhat puzzling given how
the paragraph from which his selected quotation is drawn concludes. Madison clarifies
that the change proposed by the Constitution “consists much less in the addition of NEW
119
POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS.”
But he
continues immediately thereafter to distinguish those invigorated powers from a separate
power: “The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an
addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained.”120 Thus,
the quote Roberts cites is part of the conclusion Madison derives from an argument
defending particular powers of the proposed national government, those “principally
concerned with external objects.” These powers, Madison stresses, are not new powers
added by the Constitution but original powers invigorated thereby. Hence, the conclusion
Madison draws about those original powers—that, in the political world as then
constituted, they leave undisturbed various state powers—cannot properly apply to
powers that truly are new, of which the commerce power is the principal example cited.
For an argument that culminates in the rejection of a Commerce Clause justification for
congressional action, this is, to say the least, an inauspicious start.
3. Principle (3): The Police Power
Roberts’s denial in Principles (1) and (2) of federal underdeterminacy and the
consequences of the variability of the people’s attachment both persists in and furnishes
the basis for his contention in Principle (3) that the powers of the federal government
mustn’t be construed as “creating a general federal authority akin to the police

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 17, 29.
Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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power.”121 Here again we see the influence of his interpretation of Federalist 45, but this
time he has gone one step further. Whereas Principle (2) made Madison’s observation
into a rule of constitutional design, in Principle (3) it is the foundation for a
constitutionally protected category of state powers. Such a conception of the state-federal
relationship is the hallmark of a determinate understanding of the federal system. What is
particularly striking about this argument is that after stressing the point that state powers
are not grounded in the Constitution [Principle (2)], Roberts then argues that those very
powers serve as affirmative limits on Congress’s constitutional powers. While Roberts
makes a point of citing Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland throughout the
introduction to his own opinion, it must be acknowledged that his understanding of the
state-federal relationship is a mirror image of Marshall’s, in that it reverses the central
components. For Marshall, a proper understanding of the state-federal relationship was
attained by first fleshing out the meaning and extent of national sovereignty and then
determining the points at which state power must yield to national power.122 But for
Roberts, the exact opposite is true. Understanding the extent of national power begins
with the acknowledgment that it is limited by a body of supreme state powers. Nowhere
is this difference more clear than in Roberts’s invocation of state police powers,123 the
doctrinal innovation contrived by the Taney Court to oppose Marshall’s understanding of
the state-federal relationship.124
B. Principle (4): Constitutional Avoidance
As important as they are in their own right, Principles (1)-(3) merit additional
attention for the subsequent argument they enable, which Roberts introduces with his
fourth principle: “Our permissive reading of [Congress’s enumerated] powers is
explained in part by a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected
leaders. . . . Our deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in
matters of law.”125 Having set the stage with Principles (1)-(3) for rejecting the
Commerce Clause justification for the ACA’s Individual Mandate in the face of
constitutional doubts, Roberts provides in Principle (4) the justification for interpreting
and ultimately upholding the mandate as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power. Unlike
the first three principles, Principle (4) expressed the general sense of the whole Court: no
justice disagreed with the proposition that in certain circumstances the Court can—
indeed, should—prioritize statutory interpretations that avoid rather than confront
constitutional doubts. There were, to be sure, strong disagreements among the justices
surrounding the canon’s use.126 But those concerned the necessity of employing or the
proper threshold for triggering such a construction in the case at hand, not whether it
was improper for the Court ever to consider doing so. The clear message of NFIB
121. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
122. In addition to McCulloch v. Maryland, see Marshall’s opinion elaborating his theory of national
sovereignty in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
123. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
124. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837); Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. 257
(1837).
125. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
126. Cf. id. at 2593-94 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2650-55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, J., dissenting).
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(perhaps one of the few) is that the avoidance canon is a per se legitimate and valuable
tool of statutory interpretation that is only invalid per accidens. For this reason, the
observation made in 1967 by Judge Henry Friendly could just as well have been spoken
in 2012: “questioning the doctrine of construction to avoid constitutional doubts is rather
like challenging Holy Writ.”127
The canon of constitutional avoidance is actually a set of related propositions.128
In its most general form, it holds that when a congressional enactment is susceptible of
more than one plausible interpretation and one of those is (potentially) constitutionally
problematic while the other is not, the non-problematic interpretation should prevail. The
parenthetical suggests that the canon is, perhaps, not as straightforward as it may at first
appear. And indeed, in practice the avoidance canon admits of two versions: the classical
and the modern.129 On the classical version, if on its most natural reading a statute would
be unconstitutional, then and only then can the judge seek an alternate plausible
interpretation on which it would be constitutional. On the modern version, if a statute’s
most natural reading raises constitutional doubts or difficult constitutional questions, the
judge should adopt an interpretation that avoids such questions. The difference between
the two versions can be put in terms of the threshold for triggering the canon’s use. For
the classical version, the threshold is a finding of unconstitutionality for the most natural
reading; for the modern, it is a finding of constitutional doubts or difficult constitutional
questions.
Though the classical version was a fixture of constitutional jurisprudence
throughout much of the nineteenth century, it gave way to the modern version in the
early twentieth century because of growing unease with the constitutional analysis
required by classical avoidance.130 As William Kelley puts it, “a court could not
recognize the circumstances calling for its invocation until it had first effectively
engaged in judicial review and concluded that a particular reading of a statute would
render it unconstitutional.” But the subsequent adoption of a permissible interpretation
made the preceding constitutional analysis look like dicta, thus putting the Court “in the
apparent position of rendering advisory opinions on constitutional questions.”131
Formally recognizing these concerns in the 1909 case Delaware & Hudson,132 the Court
began shifting to the modern version of the avoidance canon.
Of the various justifications offered for the avoidance canon, the two most
prominent are also those most relevant to the inquiry at hand. First, as argued at some
length by William Eskridge and his co-authors,133 a norm of construing statutes to avoid
constitutional doubts reflects a commitment to legislative supremacy. As Kelley notes,
the development of the modern version of the canon was part and parcel of an effort to

127. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211 (1967).
128. See generally, ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 50-54 (2014).
129. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949-50 (1997).
130. See William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 831, 840-41 (2001).
131. Id. at 840.
132. United States ex. rel. Attorney General. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).
133. Kelley, supra note 130, at 843-44 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2000)).
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establish “that the Court defers to Congress and thereby serves the separation of powers
by not deciding constitutional questions.”134 Because the will of the people is expressed
through their representatives in Congress, the Court should make every effort to respect
its collective judgment as to what the Constitution means and permits. Such respect
requires avoiding the conclusion that Congress acted unconstitutionally when an
alternate interpretation is available whereby that act could be sustained. Summarizing
this line of argument, Gillian Metzger and Trevor Morrison write that according to this
legislative supremacy justification, “Congress is presumed to intend to legislate within
constitutional limits and to avoid legislating in a way that pushes the constitutional
envelope.”135 Proper adjudication, then, requires honoring congressional judgment.
Second, and closely related to the first justification, the avoidance canon is
grounded on the belief that courts should, where possible, avoid creating constitutional
law by passing on constitutional questions. Against the backdrop of the rejection of
Lochner-era jurisprudence and the constitutional limitations it imposed, the Court came
to the view that constitutional adjudication should be a last resort.136 This justification is
premised on a view of the separation of powers that entails a sharp distinction between
law and politics. According to this view, it is for Congress to make laws and for the
Court to uphold the Law (i.e., the Constitution). Thus, through giving the legislature
wide berth by substantially deferring to its determinations and only addressing
constitutional doubts where absolutely necessary, the Court could serve this vision of the
separation of powers. Here the conceptual proximity between this justification and the
legislative supremacy justification becomes clear. Because Congress is the supreme
lawmaker and because the rejection on constitutional grounds of a congressional
enactment effectively denies the validity of that supremacy in a particular instance, the
Court must limit itself to its proper function: policing and enforcing constitutional limits.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, critics of the avoidance canon have addressed their
arguments to the very justifications offered by its defenders. Against the case that the
canon respects legislative supremacy, they have argued that the canon does no such
thing. For one, constitutional avoidance often requires distorting unambiguous statutory
language, or even clear congressional intent, a fact expressed by the very terms of the
canon. These critics stress that, because judicial skepticism of the constitutionality of a
congressional enactment is inherent in the avoidance canon, it is difficult to cloak in the
language of legislative supremacy and deference to popularly elected representatives
actions that entail the substitution of a judicial for a legislative judgment. Such was the
view of the joint dissent in NFIB, which argued that, “to say that the Individual Mandate
merely imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”137 Moreover, the
sharp distinction between law and politics that supports the legislative supremacy

134. Id. at 841.
135. Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Individual
Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1718 (2013).
136. See, e.g., Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Com’n, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Delaware & Hudson, 213
U.S. 366 (1909). See Ashwander v. Tenn, Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(identifying seven principles for avoiding constitutional questions); see also Kelley, supra note 130, at 838-39.
137. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2655 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito,
J., dissenting).
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justification serves to aggrandize the Court’s role because it puts beyond legislative
control the Court’s determination of what is and what is not of constitutional concern.
While the Court may in theory be restrained from addressing merely policy-regarding
questions, it is the Court that in fact says which questions do and do not qualify as such.
How this honors the role and position of the Legislative branch in the constitutional
order, these critics contend, is far from clear.
And as for the point about avoiding the unnecessary creation of constitutional law,
critics of the canon have persuasively shown that such a justification rings rather hollow.
Scholars and jurists alike express this view. Frederick Schauer has stated the critics’ case
most comprehensively. After observing that the avoidance canon frequently requires the
adoption of a strained interpretation, he concludes that, “it is by no means clear that a
strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less
a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less
strained interpretation of the same statute.”138 Moreover, with an argument that echoes
the reasons for which the Court shifted from the classical version of the canon to the
modern version, he shows that “because the identification of the ‘potential’ constitutional
problem turns out for this set of cases to be dispositive, the idea that the court is avoiding
a constitutional decision is illusory.”139 According to Judge Posner, the avoidance canon
serves to in effect create a “judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’”140 by cordoning off
areas of constitutional sensitivity from legislative influence. By avoiding putative
constitutional doubts, the Court signals to Congress its convictions (or, at least,
inclinations) about the avoided question. While it is true that such a move would fall
short of a definitive constitutional ruling, to a rational legislator the message would be
the same: this area is off limits. This should be enough, these critics of the avoidance
canon contend, to give the lie to the argument that constitutional avoidance avoids the
unnecessary creation of constitutional law.
Strikingly absent from the history, defenses, and even critiques of the avoidance
canon is any reference to the bearing of the concrete politics surrounding the passage of a
congressional enactment on the Court’s treatment thereof. Indeed, the Court has deemed
such considerations irrelevant to their duty to “say what the law is.”141 For Chief Justice
Roberts in NFIB, the politics surrounding the Individual Mandate’s passage was merely a
matter of inconsequential “labels.” Responding to the dissent’s argument that the
mandate’s denomination as a “penalty” precluded its justification under the taxing
power, Roberts argued that on this view “even if the Constitution permits Congress to do
exactly what we interpret the statute to do, the law must be struck down because
Congress used the wrong labels.”142 Where politics does enter the Court’s calculus, it is
at the very abstract level expressed by the distinction between law and politics that
138. Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (1995).
139. Id. at 89. In a similar vein, Anthony Vitarelli has analogized the avoidance canon to administrative law,
arguing that the canon involves—indeed, entails—a “step zero” inquiry that requires “reaching an initial factual
determination of constitutional doubt.” See Vitarelli, Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero, 119 YALE L.J. 837,
837 (2010).
140. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800, 816 (1983).
141. See Metzger & Morrison, supra note 135, at 1730.
142. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2597.
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justifies the Court’s self-proclaimed primacy in matters of law. Politics is that thing
Congress and the President do, and in which the Court must not meddle. As far as the
Court is concerned, there is a virtual firewall between the politics that produced the
statute and the statutory language that comes before the Court. Thus, the avoidance
canon denies that the Court’s statutory interpretation should be constrained or otherwise
influenced by the political facts that attended the piece of legislation under review.
When the matter is stated thusly, it becomes clear that when the Court employs the
more extreme version of the avoidance canon it does far more than rewrite the statute, as
the joint dissenters in NFIB urged.143 It rewrites the political history of that piece of
legislation—the complex series of decisions, deliberations, and public justifications that
produced the statute. For the use of the avoidance canon implies that the legislative
product Congress produced can be disconnected for legal purposes from how Congress
produced it. Only then could something as fundamental as the constitutional basis for a
piece of legislation be swapped out for another in the face of constitutional doubts. So in
the case of the ACA, what is entailed by the Court’s upholding the Individual Mandate
under the taxing power rather than the commerce power is the belief that (a) the statute
would have been no different had congressmen and women justified, debated, and
constructed it as a tax rather than a commercial regulation (or vice versa), or (b) it does
not matter how Congress justified the bill as it was being constructed, only how the
statute stands in relation to (the Court’s understanding of) the powers at Congress’s
disposal. Both of these possibilities are deeply problematic, and we can see exactly why
if we return to the fundamental components of the federal system elaborated in Parts I
and II: constitutional underdeterminacy and the centrality of citizens’ attachment to
shaping the precise contours of the state-federal relationship.
Consider first the underdeterminacy of the federal system. The understanding I
have advanced foregrounds the role of political construction in the elaboration of the
state-federal relationship. Although this view does not necessarily foreclose judicial
engagement with legislation touching on the scope of national power, it does highlight
the role of politics in the definition of that scope. Moreover, it should lead us to consider,
when confronted with a use of the avoidance canon, whether the difference between the
constitutional ground avoided and the constitutional ground chosen has any relation to
the statute in question. That is, had the Individual Mandate been passed as a tax would it
have been any different than if it had been passed as a commercial regulation? For what
reasons could one justification have been more salient than another? And in back of
these, what does it means for a law to be passed pursuant to a specific constitutional
power and not another?
Questions such as these focus our attention on two considerations. First, there is
the relationship between what could be called political form and constitutional function.

143. By this I mean that the following argument applies most directly to the classical version of the
avoidance canon. The insight underlying this distinction is that it’s easier to tell, for reasons set out below,
whether Congress was acting pursuant to one power and not another than it is to determine if Congress
intended to confront or avoid a constitutional question. The complications surrounding its application to the
modern version can be set aside here because the version employed by the Court in NFIB was markedly
classical. See Mark Tushnet, Did the Chief Justice Have to Decide the Commerce Clause Question in NFIB,
BALKINIZATION (July 3, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/did-chief-justice-have-to-decide.html.
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Recall that the avoidance canon either denies or almost entirely dismisses any
relationship between the politics that produced a law and the text of the statute that
comes before the Court. Regardless of the politics surrounding the passage of a statute
(i.e., its political form), all that matters for the Court is its bearing on valid congressional
powers (i.e., its constitutional function). But a sensitivity to the role of politics in
structuring the state-federal relationship makes one loathe to close the door on a
relationship such as this. Indeed, this sensitivity leads one to interrogate how political
forms shape, constrain, or determine constitutional functions and how, as a consequence,
constitutional functions are inseparable from the political forms that produce them.
Consider in this light the tax-versus-penalty argument between the joint dissenters
and the majority,144 not as a matter principally of statutory interpretation but rather as a
matter of the relationship between politics and policy. Reoriented along these lines, that
debate then becomes not about the best reading of the statute in light of its formal
properties but about the relationship of those properties to the underlying politicalconstitutional choices made in the legislative process. When Congress seeks to exercise
its taxing power, it acts in recognizable ways. To name just a few, the bill must originate
in the House of Representatives,145 certain committees must be involved in the drafting
and markup processes, noncompliance fees must be identified, and collection procedures
must be specified. These, in turn, decisively shape the legislation in question,
determining, for example, who is empowered to act on behalf of the government and
whether new agencies must be created or existing agencies repurposed. Stated more
generally, the taxing power puts some legislative tools on the table that otherwise would
not be available (e.g., fees to be collected by the IRS), even as it takes other tools off the
table (e.g., criminalizing certain behavior under penalty of prosecution), and in so doing
dictates certain procedural requirements for the construction and passage of the bill. The
same is true for Congress’s power to regulate commerce, just as it is for each of its
powers set forth in the Constitution. Hence, to substitute one constitutional foundation
for another in the face of constitutional doubts is to effectively rewrite the political
history that stands behind a statute’s text, severing the connection between political
forms and constitutional functions.
Moving on from the relationship between political form and constitutional
function, we confront the second consideration brought to light when the assumptions
underlying the avoidance canon are laid bare and questioned: the role of political
constraints in shaping the political processes that produce legislation. When political
constraints (or safeguards) are invoked, what is often meant are the features of
institutional design or the explicit procedural requirements that give shape to the political
process.146 But this is a very anemic notion of political constraints, on the one hand
144. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2650-655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §7. It is in this connection, perhaps, that Origination Clause challenges to
the ACA could have significance beyond the strict procedural defect they allege. See Sissel v. HHS, 746 F.3d
468 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Hotze v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 864, 878 (2014).
146. Not coincidentally, many of these articulations come in the context of the state-federal relationship. The
seminal piece is Herbert Wechlser, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (opposing judicial
review to protect the states from Congress on historical and prudential grounds). See also Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000)
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focusing on the few procedural requirements set forth in the Constitution and, on the
other, frequently conflating the structure of representative institutions with the substance
of representation.147 One can be even more blunt in critiquing this notion of political
constraints: it is not quite clear what is political about them other than that they structure
one subset of political behavior and helpfully buttress the conventional distinction
between law and politics. To define political constraints as the constitutionally imposed
requirements of, and implicitly limitations on, the legislative process, or as the
(putatively) intended substantive effects of institutional design overlooks the profound
ways in which certain forms of politics—what I have been calling constitutional
politics—serve as constitutional constraints. Moreover, these forms of politics furnish
valuable resources for evaluating the quality and constitutional authority of claims about
what the Constitutions means.
To see how this is the case, we must return to the relational dimensions of the
federal system, specifically the role of attachment in shaping the state-federal
relationship. Attachment, in both its Federalist and Anti-Federalist variants, rests on
epistemic prerequisites. This is not nearly as abstract as it sounds. All it amounts to is
this: in order for a citizen to ascertain and evaluate what her governments are doing, she
must first know what they are doing. And for attachment to operate well (i.e., for it to
give effect and purpose to that citizen’s evaluation of her governments in light of her
preferences), that knowledge must accurately map onto political reality. Thus, one
prerequisite for attachment to operate as a reliable determinant of the state-federal
relationship is that there must be some congruence between the public justifications
offered to citizens for governmental action and the actions government actually takes.
Otherwise, citizens will be either insufficiently informed and thus make unreliable
judgments or inaccurately informed and thus make erroneous (or suboptimal) judgments.
This, then, adds another element to the connection between political forms and
constitutional functions. The result is a three-part chain running from (1) citizens’
apprehensions and evaluations of their representatives’ actions and justifications to (2)
the political forms created by those representatives’ behaviors, and then on to (3) the
constitutional functions of the legislative outcomes.
How does this understanding of attachment bear on the use of the avoidance canon
in NFIB v. Sebelius? In a word—profoundly. For by rejecting the Commerce Clause
justification for the Individual Mandate and instead upholding it as a lawful exercise of
the taxing power, the Court severed whatever connection there may have been between
Commerce Clause justifications for the Individual Mandate given during the long debate
over the ACA and the constitutional foundation on which it was allowed to stand. Just as
important, avoiding the constitutional doubts raised by the Commerce Clause
justification in favor of a taxing power justification effectively invalidated public
avowals that the ACA was not an exercise of that power.
(opposing judicial review to protect the states from Congress on the grounds that political parties and national
party politics preserve federalism); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1976). For a critical review of these, and other,
arguments, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001).
147. See Kramer, supra note 146, at 222-23.
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In short, in our representative system the epistemic connection between citizen and
government action that serves as the basis for evaluating how well governments act runs
through the political process, and thus through the justifications representatives give for
their actions. To pass a law under one justification and uphold it against constitutional
challenge under another should raise concerns not only about democratic accountability
but also about the viability of attachment as a superintending influence on the scope of
national power vis-à-vis the states.
Underlying this argument is the observation that certain congressional powers are,
at times, less popular than others. The exercise of some powers can be harder to sell to
the public than other powers.148 What the argument about attachment adds to this is the
insight that, in the domain of constitutional politics, the prospects of public justification
carries constitutional weight. Put differently, a crucial limitation on constitutional powers
consists in public opinion organized around constitutional lines. The constitutional
powers available to Congress have their own politics, and those politics shape the
processes and procedures that produce legislation. This is, to be sure, an argument that
admits of empirical investigation. There is some evidence that both the Commerce
Clause and taxing power played a role in justifying the Individual Mandate, and an
argument is required to establish which power (or powers) serves as the constitutional
basis for Congress’s action.149 But that is precisely the point. By examining both the
relationship between political form and constitutional function and the actual politics
surrounding the debate and passage of a statute, we can understand a great deal about
what powers Congress did and did not exercise and, on that basis, evaluate the authority
with which it acted. Crucially, though, this requires looking beyond the text of the statute
for such information and, indeed, jettisoning the conventional distinction between law
and politics on which the avoidance canon is grounded.
148. For one example relevant to the specific episode under consideration, see the letter of July 16, 2009,
signed by twenty-two House Democrats to then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi opposing the use of the taxing power to
finance a portion of the total cost of the ACA (on file with author). This letter shows two things. First, that the
taxing power was clearly in play during the drafting of the health care law, though in this case not in the precise
context of the Individual Mandate. And second, that the potential use of the taxing power was unpopular
enough to lead a significant number of Democrats to petition their leader to reconsider.
149. For example, some have argued that because the ACA was subject to criticism as a tax, it is clear that
the Commerce Clause was, at best, one among multiple congressional powers at play. See Metzger &
Morrison, supra note 135, at 1733 (citing DAN BALZ, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW
HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 1, 7 (2010)). It is, however, unclear what support that
citation is intended to provide for Metzger and Morrison’s argument, as neither page referenced substantiates
their claim. Nonetheless, opposition along the lines of that expressed by Sen. Tom Coburn’s gloss on a
Congressional Research Service white paper is sufficient to sustain the proposition that the use of the taxing
power as a justification for the Individual Mandate was subject to criticism (on file with author). See also Ezra
Klein, How does the individual mandate work? WASH. POST VOICES, Mar. 25, 2010 (noting that the “irony of
the mandate is that it’s been presented as a terribly onerous tax”).
Nonetheless, popular and professional reaction, in conjunction with a high profile rejection of the taxing power
justification by President Obama are enough to establish the salience, if not the preeminence, of the Commerce
Clause justification throughout the drafting and debate of the ACA. See Robert Pear, Changing Stance,
Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/health/policy/18health.html?_r=0 (quoting Jack Balkin saying that
President Obama “has not been honest with the American people about the nature of this bill. This bill is a tax.
Because it is a tax, it’s completely constitutional”). See also Jacqueline Klingebiel, Obama: Mandate is Not a
Tax, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax;
Chris Frates & Mike Allen, Health bill says ‘tax’ when President Obama says ‘not’, POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27384.html.
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When considerations of constitutional politics—of how constitutional structures
and institutions shape political processes—are taken off the table under the guise of a
sharp distinction between law and politics or deference to legislative supremacy, all that
remains available for analysis (for judges and citizens alike) are formalistic invocations
of the Constitution made in the course of the political process. To wit, on this point
commentators have adverted to the importance of clear statement rules,150 constitutional
deliberation in Congress, or the relatively new House rule requiring all legislation to be
accompanied by a statement identifying the constitutional powers that authorize the
enactment of the bill.151 Far too often, scant attention is paid to the role of actual
politics, not scripted interactions or formalistic invocations of the Constitution, in the
generation of constitutional meaning and authority. For in constitutional politics—the
often messy compound of political debates, public justifications, legislative drafting, and
the inseparable relationship of political form and constitutional function—are
indispensable resources not only for identifying the ways in which the state-federal
relationship is contested and redefined, but also for evaluating the authority with which
Congress acts. But all of this is obscured by the canon of constitutional avoidance. The
question then is, in light of all that has been said about constitutional underdeterminacy
and the role of the people’s attachment in shaping the state-federal relationship, what is
the Court to do when confronted with a question along the lines of that presented in
NFIB v. Sebelius? What should the Court do when confronted with a question about the
scope of national power vis-à-vis the states?
C. Federalism and the Court: Not Process-Based But Processual
The emphasis I placed on the political dimensions of the state-federal relationship,
both in the preceding argument against the use of the avoidance canon in NFIB and in
the understanding of the federal system outlined in Parts I and II, raises an obvious
question about the propriety of judicial review in such matters. This question is made all
the more pressing by the deep literature rejecting judicial review in federalism disputes
on the basis of various “political safeguards” of federalism. For instance, in broadly
similar ways, Herbert Wechsler, Jesse Choper, Larry Kramer, and Bradford Clark have
all argued that the Supreme Court should refrain from reviewing at least one set of
federalism questions.152 Adducing evidence ranging from constitutional structure153 to
150. See Metzger & Morrison, supra note 135, at 1720-24.
151. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV. 174
(2013); Russ Feingold, The Obligation of Members of Congress to Consider Constitutionality While
Deliberating and Voting: The Deficiencies of House Rule XII and a Proposed Rule for the United States
Senate, 67 VAND. L. REV. 837 (2014). See also Metzger & Morrison, supra note 135 (seemingly expressing
hope that the rule will influence congressional behavior in a meaningful way).
In light of these optimistic accounts, a cautionary note is warranted. Despite its potential for inducing,
expressing, and codifying constitutional deliberation in the House of Representatives, to date no study has
systematically evaluated the content of the Constitutional Authority Statements (CAS) required by House Rule
XII (text available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf). The preliminary results of a large-scale
analysis of CAS from the 112th Congress suggest that the rule cannot be said to induce or reveal a significant
degree of robust constitutional discourse. Further, the analysis suggests that Rule XII either reveals or induces
significant noncompliance on behalf of Democratic lawmakers. See Connor M. Ewing, Theory vs. Praxis:
Constitutional Discourse and House Rule XII (draft and data on file with author).
152. In addition to the sources cited supra note 146, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
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the effects of party politics154 to the role of the separation of powers,155 these so-called
political-process theorists contend that political safeguards such as these supply
sufficient protection for states and for the federal system.156 Critics of this general view,
most notably John Yoo and Sai Prakash,157 have largely focused their efforts on
presenting a structural and historical case for judicial review. To wit, they have argued
that the review of legislation concerning the scope of national power and the relationship
between the federal and state governments (a) follows from the nature of the political
system established by the Constitution and (b) was widely expected at the time of the
Constitution’s creation and ratification.
Supreme Court jurisprudence over the last three decades has mirrored this debate
between process-theorists and their critics. The Court’s ruling in Garcia,158 finding that
the quest for “traditional” or “integral” governmental functions announced nine years
earlier in Usery159 was unworkable, was widely interpreted as a partial acceptance of the
process-theory of federalism and its implications for judicial review. This was due in no
small part to its explicit citation of both Wechsler160 and Choper.161 For this reason, this
understanding of the state-federal relationship and the Court’s role therein has arguably
become a basic, though by no means undisputed, principle in its own right. Even so, the
Court’s embrace of process-based federalism in Garcia proved over time to be more of a
fling than an enduring romance, suffering, in Larry Kramer’s words, both “insult and
injury” in the years following its decision.162 Hence, in addition to the question about
judicial review noted at the outset of this section, there is yet another. What, if anything,
does this argument add to the debate between process-theorists and their critics about
judicial review? I would like to argue that, as illustrated by the foregoing critique of the
avoidance canon and the positions advanced in Parts I and II, it adds quite a bit,
specifically because it identifies grounds for legitimate judicial review somewhere
between wholesale abdication of review (à la the process-theorists) and attempts to

(1980); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
153. See Wechlser, supra note 146; Choper, supra note 146.
154. See Kramer, supra note 146.
155. See Clark, supra note 152.
156. A significant proviso, offered most explicitly by Jesse Choper, is that the Court should abandon review
of federalism questions but attend assiduously to questions implicating individual rights.
157. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997); Prakash &
Yoo, supra note 146.
158. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
159. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
160. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n.11, 565 n.9, 587 (1985).
161. Id. at 551 n.11, 554 n.18.
162. The insult refers to uncommonly blunt judicial and academic criticism of the majority’s opinion in
Garcia. See, e.g., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting) (expressing confidence that the Court would
soon come around to his view); William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1709, 1724 n.64 (1985) (saying that Justice Blackmun’s argument was difficult to take as “other than a goodhearted joke”). The injury refers to the Court’s parings of Garcia’s central holding in (inter alia) New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking the “Take Title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act on the grounds that it impermissibly commandeered state lawmakers); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that state executive officials cannot be commandeered by federal
mandate in the course of striking down temporary provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act);
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act as an impermissible
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
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specify the internal limits on congressional powers (à la Yoo and Prakash).163 This
notion of judicial review I will call “processual review,” and it can be illustrated by
reference to the earlier critique of the avoidance canon and by application to the question
presented in NFIB v. Sebelius.
Recall that my critique of the avoidance canon invoked considerations that while
not strictly procedural, nonetheless involved the substance of the political process. By
drawing a connection between political form and constitutional function, and
subsequently extending that connection to citizens’ evaluations of governmental actions,
I argued that Congress’ enumerated powers decisively shape both its legislative products
and processes. In her analysis of constitutional authority in the domain of war powers,
Mariah Zeisberg makes a similar move, arguing that the substantive standards that
structure the constitutional politics of war and defense can be translated into “a set of
standards for assessing the branches’ war powers politics.”164 These she called
“processual” standards. Elsewhere, Zeisberg elaborates on this mode of political
analysis, explaining that “democratic processualism allows us to evaluate how well
existing democratic institutions and practices evoke the reasons we need to make good
judgments . . . [and] focuses on the relationship between practices of reason-giving and
the exercise of legitimate authority.”165 “Democratic processualism,” she concludes,
“pertains to the capacity of institutions to elicit forms of reason-giving that are
appropriate for the political questions at hand.”166
To be clear, Zeisberg does not offer her processual standards as criteria for judicial
review.167 But just as the substantive standards set forth in the Constitution structure the
politics surrounding war powers, so too do they structure the politics of the state-federal
relationship. And just as processual standards can be derived from the politics of war
powers, such standards can be derived from the politics of state-federal relations. That is
the essence of my argument about the relationship between political form and
constitutional function and the importance of attachment in shaping the state-federal
relationship. As I argued was revealed by the use of the avoidance canon in NFIB, there
are serious constitutional costs when these relationships are severed or obscured. Judicial
review can thus play a crucially important role in maintaining these relationships by
insisting on congruence between the public justifications and political forms that
attended the passage of a piece of legislation and its constitutional functions as a matter
of law. To offer a more formal definition, processual review entails (a) the evaluation of
legislative acts on the constitutional basis or bases that structured the processes by which
those acts were debated, crafted, justified, and ultimately passed, (b) supplemented by
the deference to legislative determinations that is correlative of the underdeterminacy of
the federal system. Judicial review along these lines would ensure that popular
attachment could shape the division of state and national powers while also recognizing
163. See Primus, supra note 7, for a sophisticated critique of this latter position.
164. Zeisberg, supra note 14, at 31. A further affinity between this argument and Zeisberg’s is the relevance
of constitutional underdeterminacy to the constitutional politics being examined, underdeterminacy that
requires attending to the role of politics in constructing constitutional meaning. Id. at 5 n.23.
165. Mariah Zeisberg, Democratic Processualism, 41 J. SOC. PHIL. 203 (2010).
166. Id. at 205.
167. Zeisberg, supra note 14, at 261.
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Congress’s role in constructing the state-federal relationship.
I am under no illusions that this solves all, or perhaps even many, of the
complicated and contentious questions presented by a case like NFIB v. Sebelius. But I
do think it provides at least the outlines of a constitutional theory that does justice to both
the best understanding of the federal system and the requirements of a healthy
constitutional politics. So in NFIB, adherence to processual review would incline the
Court against using the avoidance canon as it did provided it could establish that the
constitutional basis that would be avoided by the canon’s use (i.e., the Commerce
Clause) decisively shaped the politics and public justifications surrounding the statute.
As alluded to in the argument about establishing the relationships between political
forms, constitutional functions, and citizen evaluations, this is not self-evident but
instead demands empirical investigation. Thus, the Court would have to evaluate the
politics that produced the ACA.168 But it would do so on the terms that Congress has set
for itself, because the evaluation would be guided by the recognized forms of
congressional behavior that have developed from Congress’ decisions about how its
constitutionally granted powers are properly exercised. If it was determined that the
Commerce Clause decisively shaped the politics of the Individual Mandate while the
Taxing and Spending Clause did not, then the Court should review it on the basis of the
Commerce Clause. And, indeed, it would be far better in such a scenario for the Court to
strike the mandate on Commerce Clause grounds than uphold it on Taxing and Spending
Clause grounds, though nothing in my argument would require that substantive
judgment.169 For unless the connection between political forms and constitutional
functions is preserved, then the people cannot evaluate their governments and, on that
basis, “choose their champion.” And such a result would deny the fundamental nature of
our federal system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The burden of this Essay has been to show that an accurate account of the
foundations and development of the American federal system must incorporate both its
structural and relational components. I have argued that these two components in turn
shape two tensions that animate the politics of sovereignty in the American constitutional
order: the underdeterminacy of the federal system and the people’s attachment to their
governments. Among much else, this argument demonstrates that sovereignty is a
crucially important analytical concept in American political and constitutional
development, not because it has a single, unchanging meaning but precisely because it is
essentially contested and constructed through constitutional politics. Sovereignty is both
the object of political contestation and part of the background against which that
contestation plays out. This relationship suggests that debates over sovereignty take
place in a political and legal context structured by the resolution of previous episodes of
conflict. The contestation of sovereignty in the American federal system is an integral
168. In an intriguing way, this necessity evokes a different (and quite well developed) application of
processual investigation: processual archaeology. See GORDON R. WILLEY & PHILIP PHILLIPS, METHOD AND
THEORY IN AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY (1958).
169. On this point, I agree with Schauer, supra note 138, at 74, but for reasons other than those he offers.
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part of the commitment to popular sovereignty because such conflict unsettles any one
governmental level’s claim to unchecked decisional authority and thus makes possible
the aspiration of self-governance. The people’s ability to “choose their champion” both
undergirds and depends on the underdeterminacy of the state-federal relationship. As
goes the latter, so goes the former.
Nowhere in recent political and constitutional history was this clearer than in the
Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Not because
the Court affirmed the underdeterminacy of the state-federal relationship or preserved the
role for popular attachment that I have described, but because it advanced an
understanding of the federal system that decisively rejected both. Through a close
evaluation of the four “basic principles” that guided Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis, I
showed precisely how his arguments jettisoned these fundamental components of the
federal system. While all four principles were critiqued for rejecting constitutional
underdeterminacy and the role of popular attachment in shaping the federal system, it
was the fourth principle, that justifying the Court’s use of the canon of constitutional
avoidance, that received the greatest attention. By illustrating how the structural and
relational components of the federal system meaningfully shape while also rendering
meaningful the constitutional politics of federalism, I argued that the avoidance canon as
used in NFIB entailed a significant distortion of a constitutionally grounded
understanding of the federal system. I then sketched the broad contours of what I termed
“processual review,” a form of judicial review premised on the maintenance of the
connections between political forms, constitutional functions, and citizens’ evaluations
of their governments. Unlike extant models of judicial review derived from processbased theories of federalism, on the one hand, and models predicated on identifying
internal limits to constitutional powers, on the other, processual review recognizes and
upholds the structural and relational understanding of the federal system that I have
advanced. Though processual review by no means resolves all of the questions
concerning the scope of national power vis-à-vis the states, it orients judicial inquiry
around the fundamental components of the federal system. And in so doing, it serves a
central aspiration of our constitutional system: that both our politics and our law would
reflect the desires, hopes, and reasoned judgments of the people.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015

41

